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02-1667 Tennessee v. Lane
Ruling Below: (6th Cir., 315 F.3d 680, 13 A.D. Cas. 1665)
Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act constitutes valid abrogation of states' 11th
Amendment immunity from suit by private parties alleging due process violations, in light of (i)
evidence establishing that physical barriers in public buildings, including courthouses and
courtrooms, have had effect of denying disabled people opportunity to exercise fundamental
rights guaranteed by due process clause and (ii) Congress's authority under Section 5 of 14th
Amendment to enact legislation to vindicate such rights; 11th Amendment does, however, bar
suit against state by private parties under Title II of ADA based on alleged equal protection
violations; action under Title II by disabled individuals alleging that inaccessibility of physical
facilities barred access to state courts should not be dismissed, because factual record is not yet
sufficiently developed to permit determination of whether due process violations are alleged.
Question Presented: Does Title II of ADA exceed Congress's authority under Section 5 of 14th
Amendment, thereby failing validly to abrogate states' 11th Amendment immunity from private
damage claims?
George LANE; Beverly Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
United States of America, Intervenor,
V.
State of TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellant,
Polk County, Tennessee, et al., Defendants.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided January 10, 2000
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit
Judge.
This Court initially issued an opinion in this
case on July 16, 2002. We held that Lane
and Jones stated claims founded in due
process violations, and, under Popovich v.
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.2002) (en banc) cert.
denied, 123 S.Ct. 72, 154 L.Ed.2d 15
(2002), Tennessee and the other state
defendants were not immune from Lane and
Jones's damages claims under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. On
September 20, we granted the State of
Tennessee's motion for panel rehearing. All
parties submitted supplemental briefs.
Tennessee argued that Lane and Jones's
claims are not based on due process
violations and that Tennessee therefore
enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit on those claims. On rehearing and for
the following reasons, we AFFIRM the
district court's denial of Tennessee's motion
to dismiss and REMAND this case for
further proceedings.
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In Popovich, we considered the validity of
the abrogation of a state's immunity to suit
by private parties under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Guiding
our hand through our evaluation was the
Supreme Court's recent decision in
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001),
in which the Supreme Court affirmed that
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states
to private damage suits. We held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred claims under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act based on equal protection violations but
Congress could abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity as to due process
claims.
Among the rights protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the right of access to the
courts. For criminal defendants like Lane,
the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
to provide that "an accused has a right to be
present at all stages of the trial where his
absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings." Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Parties in civil
litigation have an analogous due process
right to be present in the courtroom and to
meaningfully participate in the process
unless their exclusion furthers important
governmental interests. See Popovich, 276
F.3d at 8 13-14; Helminski v. Ayerst Labs.,
766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 386, 88 L.Ed.2d
339 (1985). Further, those who fail to appear
in court may not be sanctioned for failing to
appear until they have been accorded due
process. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502,
92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972). These
guarantees are protective of equal justice
and fair treatment before the courts.
The evidence before Congress when it
enacted Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act established that physical
barriers in government buildings, including
courthouses and in the courtrooms
themselves, have had the effect of denying
disabled people the opportunity to access
vital services and to exercise fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause. In Popovich, we found that Title II
was enacted "to guarantee meaningful
enforcement" of the constitutional rights of
the disabled. 276 F.3d at 815-16. In doing
so, Congress may require states to consider
the nature of the constitutional right at issue,
the often relatively small cost of
compliance, and the effect of failure to
accommodate those with disabilities. In the
context of the case before us, Congress
could ask states to weigh the fundamental
importance of access to the courts to our
justice system, that the perpetuation of the
current physical barriers force people with
disabilities to either forgo their right to be
present in court or be carried into court, and
that the remedy is often inexpensive and
simple.
Based on the record before Congress in
considering the Americans with Disabilities
legislation, it was reasonable for Congress to
conclude that it needed to enact legislation
to prevent states from unduly burdening
constitutional rights, including the right of
access to the courts. States have myriad
ways to unburden these rights, from the
major step of renovating facilities to the
relatively minor step of assigning aides to
assist in access to the facilities. The record
demonstrated that public entities' failure to
accommodate the needs of qualified persons
with disabilities may result directly from
unconstitutional animus and impermissible
stereotypes. Title II ensures that the refusal
314
to accommodate an individual with a
disability is genuinely based on
unreasonable cost or actual inability to
accommodate, not on inconvenience or
unfounded concerns about costs.
This statutory protection is a preventive
measure commensurate to the gravity of
precluding access to the courts by those with
disabilities. In addition, these requirements
are carefully tailored to the unique features
of disability discrimination that persists in
public services. A simple ban on
discrimination against those with disabilities
lacks teeth. The continuing legacy of
discrimination is too powerful. Title II
affirmatively promotes integration of those
with disabilities.
Jones and Lane are seeking to vindicate their
right of access to the courts in Tennessee.
Lane alleges that he has been denied the
benefit of access to the courts. Jones
similarly alleges that she has been excluded
from courthouses and court proceedings by
an inability to access the physical facilities.
Tennessee responds that the violations
alleged are not due process violations. The
difficult questions presented by this case
cannot be clarified absent a factual record.
Because in Popovich we held that Title II is
an appropriate means of enforcing the due
process rights of individuals, and because
this case came to us before any development
of the facts, we hold that the district court
appropriately denied Tennessee's motion to
dismiss this action.
We AFFIRM the decision of the district
court and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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Justices to Hear Case on Whether the Disabled Can Sue States on Access to
Courtrooms
The New York Times
June 24, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
A state claim of immunity from suit under
the central provision of the Americans With
Disabilities Act will provide the next
Supreme Court term with a focus for the
court's continuing debate over the balance of
state and federal power.
The justices agreed today to hear
Tennessee's appeal from a ruling that left the
state open to a lawsuit by two residents who
use wheelchairs and who were unable to
gain access to state courtrooms. One
plaintiff, George Lane, crawled up two
flights of stairs for his arraignment on
misdemeanor traffic charges, and was later
arrested for "failure to appear" and jailed
when he refused to repeat the ordeal when it
came time for a pretrial hearing.
The other plaintiff, Beverly Jones, is a
certified court reporter who needs access to
courtrooms to do her job. She was unable to
enter four county courthouses where lawyers
had hired her to record the proceedings. Her
legal complaint listed 23 Tennessee counties
with inaccessible courthouses despite the
requirement of Title II of the Americans
With Disabilities Act that public "services,
programs or activities" be made accessible
to people with disabilities.
Two years ago, in University of Alabama v.
Garrett, the court examined a separate
provision of the Americans With Disabilities
Act that protects state employees from
discrimination on account of disability. The
court held that states are immune from suit
by their employees under this provision. The
access provision raises different
constitutional issues, however, and there has
been a widening split among the federal
appeals courts over how to analyze state
immunity claims under that provision. Of
the 12 appellate circuits, five have ruled for
the states, three for disabled plaintiffs at
least under some circumstances, and the
remaining four have pending cases.
In the case accepted today, Tennessee v.
Lane, No. 02-1667, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that
while the Garrett decision meant that states
could not be sued for violating the equal
protection rights of people with disabilities,
states remained liable for suit for violating
rights protected by the Constitution's
guarantee of due process. Access to court
was such a right, the appeals court held.
The justices' decision to accept the case was
almost a foregone conclusion. Three times
before, including this term, the court had
accepted a case that raised the same
question. But in two cases, the parties
dismissed the case before the court could
rule, and in the other, the justices failed to
resolve the question.
From the point of view of disability rights
advocates, none of the other cases provided
as sympathetic and compelling a set of facts
as this one. This time, lawyers for the two
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plaintiffs urged the court to hear the state's
appeal, as did lawyers for the federal
government, which had intervened on the
plaintiffs' side in the lower courts.
Copyright @ 2003 The New York Times
Company
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Does the Americans with Disabilities Act
give individuals the right to sue states? That
is the central issue in a case from Tennessee
that the U.S. Supreme Court will decide next
session.
Judging from the court's recent decisions
concerning other types of discrimination, the
plaintiffs will have an uphill battle. Over the
last few years, the Supreme Court has
shielded state governments from many types
of civil rights lawsuits, including suits
claiming age discrimination and disability
discrimination. In those instances, the court
has held that states enjoy sovereign
immunity from lawsuits seeking damages.
Collectively, those decisions have
substantially weakened anti-discrimination
laws as they apply to employees in the
public sector.
Yet if advocates for people with disabilities
are discouraged by court precedent, they
should be encouraged by the strength of the
case the justices will hear. The case involves
two paraplegics who want to sue the state of
Tennessee for failing to comply with the
ADA. One plaintiff, Beverly Jones, has
relied on a wheelchair since an auto
accident. Jones earns her living as a court
reporter, but since many courthouses around
Tennessee aren't wheelchair accessible, her
ability to do her work has been seriously
impeded.
The other plaintiff is George Lane, who also
has used a wheelchair since a car accident.
Lane was summoned to court on a
misdemeanor charge that claimed he was
driving on a revoked license on the day of
his accident. The courthouse had no
elevator, so Lane had to crawl up the steps.
When he was summoned for a second
appearance, Lane refused to crawl, and
instead sent word to the judge that he was
downstairs. He was still arrested for failure
to appear in court.
Not being physically able to do one's work,
and not being physically able to defend
oneself in court discrimination doesn't get
much more troubling than that. If a private
business had been responsible for the
discrimination against Jones and Lane, it
would have had to answer to a court of law.
Surely the Supreme Court will determine
that when discrimination is so blatant that
one's constitutional rights are violated, that
person deserves a day in court.
Copyright D 2003, The Tennessean
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STATE IMMUNITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
AFTER BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V.
GARRETT





some footnotes and citations
Introduction
The ADA was intended "to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."' *** Title II
provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."2 The Court in Garrett addressed
only Title I of the ADA. As a result, it has
yet to be determined whether private suits
for money damages will continue to be
available to private parties suing the states
under Title II. Moreover, because Garrett
addressed only private suits for monetary
damages against the states under Title I,
there is also some question as to what
alternative remedies remain available for
private plaintiffs to remedy state
discrimination under both Titles I and II of
the ADA.
I. Background Information on the ADA and
State Sovereign Immunity
State sovereign immunity and federal
legislation that purports to abrogate that
immunity involves the interplay of three
areas of law: the legislation itself, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Some background information
on the ADA and the components of the
sovereign immunity doctrine is necessary
for this discussion. ***
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
With the passage of the ADA, Congress
intended "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities" and "to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." In order to
accomplish these goals, Congress invoked
two of its constitutionally granted legislative
powers to enact the ADA: Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause. The purpose of the Act
is, in part, "to invoke the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to
regulate commerce, in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-
day by people with disabilities."
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42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
2 § 12132.
Under the ADA's statutory scheme, a
"disability" can be defined in one of three
ways: first, as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such
individual;" second, as "a record of such an
impairment;" and third, as the perception of
"having such an impairment." The Act not
only prohibits invidious discrimination
against disabled persons but also mandates
that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations" for a "qualified individual
with a disability" unless it can be
demonstrated that such an accommodation
would cause undue hardship for the
employer. Failure to make such reasonable
accommodations in the absence of undue
hardship constitutes actionable
discrimination under the ADA.
*** Title II is broader than Title I in that it
applies to all public places and public
services and applies to all disabled people,
not just disabled employees. Title II states
that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity."
Both Titles I and HI allow for money
damages to be sought by private plaintiffs
against a covered entity that violates the
ADA. *** [H]owever, under Garrett the
private monetary remedies permitted by
Title I were found unconstitutional when
challenged by the States. Moreover, under
various federal circuit courts' of appeals
decisions that followed Garrett, the
monetary remedies permitted by Title II
have been successfully resisted by states that
argue such awards violate their sovereign
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment.
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides that
"[t]he judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." ***
Although the plain text of the Eleventh
Amendment only bars suits against a state
by citizens of a different state, the Supreme
Court in Hans v. Louisiana3 took the
concept of state sovereign immunity a step
further. There, the Court held that despite its
explicit language, the Eleventh Amendment
granted immunity to the states against suits
from their own citizens. The Court in Hans
stated that because state immunity existed
prior to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment it was not limited by the
language of that amendment.
Despite Hans, Congress's ability to permit
private suits for damages against non-
consenting states in federal statutes pursuant
to its Commerce Clause powers largely went
unquestioned during the 106 years between
Hans and Seminole Tribe v. Florida.4 The
Supreme Court's modem state sovereignty
jurisprudence stems from a constitutional
test derived from a line of cases beginning
with Seminole Tribe.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court overruled
precedent and held that Congress could not
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity through its Article I
Commerce Clause powers. To reach this
result, the Court set forth a two-tiered
analysis to evaluate a statute that purports to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Under the analysis, the Court
3 134 U.S. I (1890).
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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must first determine whether Congress
"unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity."5 Second, the Court
must determine whether Congress acted
'pursuant to a valid exercise of power." 6
Applying this test to the statute in Seminole
Tribe, the Court stated that Congress had
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, but had not acted
pursuant to a valid exercise of power. To
reach that decision, the Court held that
Congress does not have the authority under
the Commerce Clause to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from private suits in
federal courts because such an exercise
would amount to an impermissible
expansion of the courts' Article M
jurisdiction. Importantly, Article H sets
forth the entire catalog of permissible
federal court jurisdiction and the bounds of
Article III can only be expanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This results
because the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified after the Eleventh Amendment and
therefore "expand[ed] federal power at the
expense of state autonomy" thereby
"fundamentally alter[ing] the balance of
state and federal power struck by the
Constitution."
After Seminole Tribe, the only way
Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity is through valid legislation passed
under its legislative powers found in Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. As will
be seen below, this means Congress can
only provide a private damage remedy
against the states in response to a pattern and
5 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73
(2000).
6 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)); see also Dellmuth
v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (holding that
Congress must make its intention to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute).
history of state behavior that violates a
person's Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
V. The ADA after Garrett
In Garrett, the United States Supreme Court
had the chance to clear up a very
complicated area of law, yet chose to
address only Title I, rather than both Titles I
and II. The Court opted only to address Title
I of the ADA, stating in footnote I that it
was ''not disposed to decide the
constitutional issue whether Title II, which
has somewhat different remedial provisions
from Title I, is appropriate legislation."7
This footnote in the Court's opinion leaves
some question as to whether there are
fundamental differences between the
remedies of the two sections that would
merit a different outcome. Thus, the Court
left open the question whether the private
monetary remedies available under Title II
are still valid.
A. Differences between the Remedies
Afforded under Titles I and II of the ADA
Importantly, the Garrett court noted that the
remedial scheme provided pursuant to Title
II is different than the remedial scheme
provided under Title I. Because the Court
7 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 360 n.1 (2001).
8 The Garrett Court noted in footnote 1 that the
remedial provisions of Titles I and II are somewhat
different. Id. Specifically, Title I in 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) states that:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in
sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and
2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies,
and procedures this title provides to the
Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any
person alleging discrimination on the basis of
disability in violation of any provision of this
chapter, or regulations promulgated under section
12116 of this title, concerning employment.
321
declined to address Title II in Garrett, in
part based on the different remedial
provisions, these differences may well be
important in an analysis of continued
validity of the private remedy under Title II.
Title I's remedial scheme incorporates the
remedial scheme of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.9 The Rehabilitation Act, in turn,
incorporates the remedies of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 The remedial
scheme of Title VI includes a judicially
implied private cause of action.
Title I, on the other hand, incorporates the
remedies found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII has an explicit
private right of action. Thus, the differences
that the Court in Garrett referred to in
footnote 1 of its opinion may well be
referring to the differences between implied
and express remedies.
B. Title II of the ADA
Aside from the differences in the remedial
provisions of the two titles, there are also
fundamental differences in what is covered
by Titles I and II. Title II applies to a greater
variety of state conduct, where Title I
applies strictly to employment
discrimination. Title II is broader than Title I
and applies to discrimination in all public
places and public services and applies to all
disabled people, not just disabled
employees. Significantly, Title II applies to
Title II in 42 U.S.C. § 12133 states that:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 794a) shall be the remedies, procedures,
and rights this title provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation
of section 202 [42 USCS § 12132].
9 29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2) (2000).
1 42 U.S.C. §§2000d-2000d-7.
11 Garcia v. State Univ. of New York Health Sci. Ctr.,
280 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 594-95
(1983).
the very broad category of all "services,
programs or activities of a public entity."
Because of the greater breadth of coverage
under Title II, there is likely more evidence
in the congressional record of
unconstitutional behavior by the states of the
conduct prohibited by Title II. In fact, the
Court in Garrett acknowledged that there
are more examples of unconstitutional state
conduct when it stated that "the
overwhelming majority of these accounts
[referring to examples of discrimination in
the congressional record] pertain to alleged
discrimination by the States in the provision
of public services and public
accommodations, which areas are addressed
in Titles II and III of the ADA."12 The
Garrett majority also quoted both the House
and the Senate Committee hearings, which
recited that discrimination was rampant in
the areas of public services, transportation,
and public accommodations, among
others. These are areas which would be
covered by Title II of the ADA. Because the
Court in Garrett only examined the
congressional record as it related to state
employment discrimination, it is unclear
whether the congressional record as to state
constitutional violations in the Title II
sphere would be seen to establish a pattern
of unconstitutional state discrimination.
However, the Supreme Court did not decide
the issue and therefore the Circuit Courts of
Appeal must each decide whether the
monetary remedies of Title II are more
constitutionally sound than those of Title I
under the analysis set forth in Garrett.
12 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7 (2001).
13 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989); H.R. Rep. No.
101-485, at 28 (1990).
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D. Conclusions: The Future of Title II
The federal district courts, like the appeals
courts and the Supreme Court, are now
examining the congressional record for a
tight congruence and proportionality fit for
Title II, as mandated in Garrett. Requiring a
detailed record of unconstitutional state
conduct represents a fairly significant
departure from the methodology used prior
to Flores, Kimel, and Garrett, where the
courts simply looked to the reasonableness
of the congressional findings.
The question remains, however: how much
support is required from the congressional
record? The answer that appears to be given
by the Supreme Court in Garrett and other
courts since is that very strong evidence of
manifest state unconstitutional
discrimination must be present in the
congressional record. ***
*** Under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, it appears that Congress will
not be permitted to allow for damages in
response to less flagrant types of
discrimination absent a substantial record of
evidence in the form of numerous examples
of irrational and therefore unconstitutional
discrimination by the states. This clear trend
in the Supreme Court will likely result in the
invalidation of private suits for money
damages against states under Title II should
the Supreme Court decide the issue. *
Copyright @ 2002 University of Colorado
Law Review; Ryan Gill
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02-628 Frew v. Hawkins
Ruling Below: (Frazar v. Gilbert, 5th Cir., 300 F.3d 530)
State did not unequivocally waive its 11th Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court by entering into consent decree expressly stating that state defendants "do not
concede liability"; because 11th Amendment limits federal courts' jurisdiction over state
to enforcement of federal rights, before district court can remedy violation of provision of
consent decree specifying procedures state must follow in implementing Medicaid early
and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment program, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that any such consent decree violation is also violation of federal right by showing (1)
statutory violation of specific provision of Medicaid Act that (2) was intended to benefit
plaintiffs, (3) is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence, and (4) imposes binding obligation on states; under latter standard,
provisions of Medicaid Act authorizing secretary of health and human services to set
state goals for individual participation in EPSDT program and to cut federal funding for
substantial failure to comply with statutory provisions do not create individualized right
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to require state plan to meet participation or
performance measures; district court did not find specific violations of EPSDT provisions
of Medicaid Act, but rather found violations of consent decree provisions that are not
required by Medicaid Act, and thus its order enforcing consent decree is vacated.
Question Presented: (1) Do state officials waive 11th Amendment immunity by urging
district court to adopt consent decree when decree is based on federal law and specifically
provides for district court's ongoing supervision of officials' decree compliance? (2) Does
11th Amendment bar district court from enforcing consent decree entered into by state
officials unless plaintiffs show that "decree violation is also a violation of a federal right"




United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Decided July 24, 2002
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations BACKGROUND
omitted.]
This suit began in 1993 when Jeneva
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge: Frazar and Linda Frew, suing on behalf
of their children, alleged that the State of
Texas (the State) and the named state
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officials (the state defendants) were
failing to provide federally mandated
Medicaid benefits to the children under
the Texas version of the early and
periodic screening, diagnostic, and
treatment services (EPSDT) program.
The Medicaid program provides federal
funding for medical services to the poor.
State participation is voluntary, but once
a state joins the Medicaid program, it is
charged with administering a state plan
and must meet certain federal mandates.
A participating state must have an
EPSDT program which provides
services described in the Medicaid Act.
Plaintiffs complained that the Texas
EPSDT program, known as the Texas
Health Steps program, had failed to
provide federally mandated services.
They claimed that the EPSDT program
did not meet various requirements of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) and 1396d(r), federal
regulations, and provisions of the State
Medicaid Manual. Specifically, plaintiffs
claimed that the EPSDT program (1) did
not have policies or procedures to assure
that class members receive health,
dental, vision, and hearing screens, (2)
did not meet annual participation goals
set by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, (3) did not effectively
inform eligible persons of the
availability of EPSDT services, (4) did
not employ policies and procedures to
provide or arrange for other necessary
measures to correct or ameliorate
physical and mental conditions
discovered by the screening services, (5)
did not provide case management
services to all EPSDT recipients as
needed, and (6) did not provide services
uniformly in all political subdivisions of
the State.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested class
certification. In 1994 the district court
certified the case as a class action.
According to the district court the class
consists of over 1.5 million Texas youth.
The parties proceeded to conduct
settlement negotiations, and agreed to a
consent decree. The record indicates that
this proposed consent decree was
reached after the district court ordered
the parties to pursue a settlement. The
district court conducted a fairness
hearing on the proposed settlement, see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), and in February
1996 approved and entered the consent
decree.
"A consent decree is akin to a contract
yet also functions as an enforceable
judicial order." The consent decree in the
pending case is a lengthy document and
orders the state defendants to implement
many highly detailed and specific
procedures relating to the EPSDT
program. It contemplates continuing
oversight of the agreement by the district
court. It states in paragraph 6 that "the
parties agree and the Court orders" the
state defendants to implement the
changes and procedures to the EPSDT
program set out in the decree, and
provides in paragraph 303 that if the
state defendants fail to comply with the
terms and intent of the decree, the
plaintiffs "may request relief from this
Court." In paragraphs 306 and 307, the
state defendants are required, "[flor the
duration of this Decree," to submit
"monitoring reports" four times a year to
the court. The reports must include a
chart which identifies "each paragraph of
this Decree that obliges Defendants to
act and each required action. The chart
will further state the status of each
325
activity." The decree places no limit on
its duration.
DISCUSSION
2. Enforceability of Consent Decree
under § 1983 and the Eleventh
Amendment
The district court, while often making
reference to statutory requirements and
the consistency of the consent decree
with the Medicaid Act, did not consider
it necessary to determine whether an
alleged violation of the consent decree
would constitute, in the absence of the
decree, a statutory violation of the
Medicaid Act remediable under § 1983.
On the contrary, it held that "[i]n
enforcing the consent decree, the court is
bound solely by its language," and that
"an interpretation of the decree must be
based strictly on the language of the
decree, and not on the legal requirements
of the Medicaid Act, except to the extent
that those requirements are clearly
imported by the language of the decree."
This was error.
While § 1983 is usually invoked in cases
where a plaintiff is claiming a
constitutional violation, by its terms it
extends to both constitutional and
statutory violations, since it provides a
remedy to those who suffer a
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States. Stating a
claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to
"allege a violation of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Section 1983 does not itself
create any substantive rights; it only
provides a remedy for the violation of a
substantive federal right conferred
elsewhere.
Proof of a violation of a federal statute,
by itself, does not entitle a plaintiff to
relief under § 1983. Instead, in Blessing
v. Freestone,14 the Court explained that
to obtain relief under § 1983, "a plaintiff
must assert the violation of a federal
right, not merely a violation of federal
law." Whether a statutory violation
amounts to a violation of a statutory
right actionable under § 1983 depends
on three factors recognized in Blessing:
First, Congress must have intended
that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the right assertedly
protected by the statute is not so vague
and amorphous that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the
States. In other words, the provision
giving rise to the asserted right must be
couched in mandatory, rather than
precatory, terms.
Employing this test, the Court in
Blessing held that 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8),
a provision of Title TV-D of the Social
Security Act authorizing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to reduce
payments to a state that does not
"substantially comply" with Title IV-D,
did not give rise to individual rights
actionable under § 1983.
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n,15
the Supreme Court held that the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which
required reimbursement according to
14 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
" 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
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rates that a state finds "are reasonable
and adequate to meet the costs which
must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities," was
enforceable by health care providers
under § 1983. In making this
determination the Court set out the same
three factors described in Blessing
above.
In Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries
Inc. v. Hood, we applied the Blessing
factors and held that one portion of one
Medicaid provision created a federal
right enforceable by Medicaid recipients,
but not Medicaid providers, under §
1983. We held that the portion of 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) relating to
equal access gave recipients a federal
right of action, but that the district court
had abused its discretion in holding that
the plaintiff recipients had shown a
substantial likelihood of success in
proving a violation of this provision
entitling them to preliminary injunctive
relief.
Applying the Blessing factors to the
pending case, there is no doubt that
under the first factor the Medicaid
program generally is intended to benefit
qualifying recipients such as members of
the plaintiff class. The Medicaid Act is,
however, a large and complex statute,
and whether plaintiffs seeking to enforce
a federal right under the Medicaid Act
can meet this requirement depends on
which statutory provision or provisions
they rely. In Evergreen, we further
explained that receipt of an indirect
benefit under the statutory provision in
issue "is not sufficient to support a claim
that [plaintiffs] are its intended
beneficiaries."
Similarly, moving to the second prong of
the Blessing test, while some of the
provisions of the Medicaid Act are not
so vague and amorphous that
enforcement would strain judicial
competence, plaintiffs' claims can
succeed only if predicated on those
provisions.
Under the third Blessing factor, the
Medicaid statute does impose some
binding obligations on the states. With
respect to the EPSDT program at issue
in the pending case, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a) provides that state Medicaid
plans "must" meet the federal mandates
set out in that statute, including the
requirements for EPSDT programs set
out in § 1396a(a)(43). We have
explained that once states choose to
participate in Medicaid, they "are
required to provide certain minimum
mandatory services," including EPSDT
services. Again, however, we are not
prepared to hold that every provision of
the Medicaid Act which might be
relevant to plaintiffs' claims imposes a
binding obligation on the states.
In addition to the three factors described
above, Blessing goes on to state:
Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a
federal statute creates an individual
right, there is only a rebuttable
presumption that the right is
enforceable under § 1983. Because our
inquiry focuses on congressional
intent, dismissal is proper if Congress
specifically foreclosed a remedy under
§ 1983. Congress may do so expressly,
by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the
statute itself, or impliedly, by creating
a comprehensive enforcement scheme
that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under § 1983.
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16 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir.2000).
Under this last part of the Blessing
analysis, Congress did not expressly
foreclose resort to § 1983, or establish a
comprehensive remedial scheme
intended to supplant § 1983. While the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
is authorized to cut off federal funding to
a State that fails to comply with the
Medicaid statute, there is no
comprehensive enforcement scheme that
would foreclose § 1983 relief under
Blessing.
It is clear that a violation of every
provision of the Medicaid Act does not
become actionable under § 1983 simply
because some aspects of the Act meet
the requirements of Blessing and related
authority. Blessing itself cautioned
against such a holding, since it found
that the Social Security legislation at
issue was a "multifaceted statutory
scheme" containing many provisions
which "do not fit our traditional three
criteria for identifying statutory rights."
While the courts in Wilder and
Evergreen held that violations of
particular provisions of the Medicaid
Act were actionable by certain plaintiffs
under § 1983, it does not follow that
every section of the Medicaid Act that
might be relevant to plaintiffs' claims
will support a § 1983 claim. In Blessing,
the Court reasoned that a remand was
warranted to allow the district court to
construe the claims "in the first instance,
in order to determine exactly what
rights, considered in their most concrete,
specific form, respondents are asserting.
Only by manageably breaking down the
complaint into specific allegations can
the District Court proceed to determine
whether any specific claim asserts an
individual federal right."
The district court's authority to enforce
the consent decree is further limited by
the Eleventh Amendment. This suit was
brought against state officials in their
official capacities, seeking injunctive
relief under § 1983 and the authority of
Ex Parte Young' 7 and related authority.
A fundamental rule of federal
jurisdiction, of which the Eleventh
Amendment is an exemplification, is that
the judicial power of the federal courts
granted by the Constitution does not
extend to suits by private parties against
the states. In order to accommodate both
the supremacy of federal law and the
Eleventh Amendment, Ex Parte Young
allows a private suit against state
officials to enjoin state conduct that
violates federal law. "[T]he Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the
vindication of federal rights." [Footnote
omitted] It "has not been provided an
expansive interpretation."
We addressed the enforceability of a
consent decree in the face of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Lelsz v.
Kavanagh.'8 In that case the state
defendants appealed a district court
order purporting to enforce a consent
decree by ordering the State to furlough
a certain number of mentally ill patients
in the State's care. We stated that the
relief ordered, "in effect, requires state
officials to comply with state law." We
held that the district court was without
jurisdiction to enforce the consent
decree.
The plaintiffs in Lelsz argued that the
consent decree was enforceable under
Local Number 93, International Ass'n of
17209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'6 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1987).
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Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,'9
where the Supreme Court held that "a
federal court is not necessarily barred
from entering a consent decree merely
because the decree provides broader
relief than the court could have awarded
after a trial." We rejected this argument,
reasoning that if the court had no
jurisdiction, Firefighters did not apply.
We further explained that Firefighters
addressed the entry of a consent decree
and held that the parties' agreement
could result in a decree whose terms
would exceed the court's remedial
authority under a governing statute. It
does not enlarge the court's latitude to
issue its own, different order enforcing
or modifying the decree, for in that
case we presume the court must fall
back on its inherent jurisdiction....
[T]he right/remedy distinction urged
by appellees inevitably collides with
the principles of federalism and comity
which animate the Eleventh
Amendment.... Therefore, the only
legitimate basis for federal court
intervention, consistent with the
Eleventh Amendment is the
vindication of federal rights. If a
federal court remedy unfounded in
federal law intrudes into the
governance of matters otherwise
presided over by the states, no federal
right has been vindicated.
In Saahir v. Estelle,20 we also addressed
the enforceability of a consent decree. In
that case, the district court had entered a
consent decree approving a settlement
between the plaintiff inmate and the state
defendants which allowed the plaintiff to
order tapes. The plaintiff filed a motion
19 478 U.S. 501 (1986) ("Firefighters").
20 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1995).
for contempt when some of his tapes
were confiscated. We recognized that in
Lelsz we had held "that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to enforce a consent
decree against the State to the extent that
the relief ordered in the decree was
based on state law ... because the only
legitimate basis for federal court
intervention consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment was the vindication of
federal rights." We held that enforcing
the consent decree to allow the plaintiff
to keep non-religious tapes was not
required under state law, and further
held that
enforcing the provision would not be
required by any federal or
constitutional law, as we fail to discern
any First Amendment protections
except as to the religious tapes.
Because "the only legitimate basis for
federal court intervention, consistent
with the Eleventh Amendment is the
vindication of federal rights," Lelsz,
807 F.2d at 1252, the federal courts
have no jurisdiction to enforce the
provision as it relates to the non-
religious tapes.
Underlying our reasoning in Lelsz and
Saahir is the jurisdictional nature of the
Eleventh Amendment. Eleventh
Amendment immunity is in "the nature
of a jurisdictional bar." Regardless of
what the parties agreed to in the consent
decree, "the Eleventh Amendment is
jurisdictional in the sense that it is a
limitation on the federal court's judicial
power." The Eleventh Amendment "is a
specific constitutional bar against
hearing even federal claims that
otherwise would be within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts."
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We recognized in Lelsz and Saahir that a
federal court "must fall back on its
inherent jurisdiction" when it issues an
order enforcing a consent decree. For
our purposes, the essential holding of
Lelsz and Saahir is that a consent decree
like the one entered by the district court
is not enforceable against the State or its
officials except to vindicate a federal
right granted in the federal Constitution
or a federal statute, since "the consent
decree does not enlarge the courts'
jurisdiction." Blessing sets out the
factors used in deciding whether a
statutory violation amounts to a violation
of a "federal right" actionable under §
1983.
The district court held that "the
Firefighters test will be applied to the
decree provisions sought to be enforced
by plaintiffs." In Firefighters the
Supreme Court upheld a consent decree
that, according to the petitioner, granted
relief that was unavailable under the
statute in issue. The Court, without
reaching the issue of statutory
construction, concluded that "a federal
court is not necessarily barred from
entering a consent decree merely
because the decree provides broader
relief than the court could have awarded
after a trial." In the pending case, the
district court, under its interpretation of
the "Firefighters test," erroneously held
that
to sustain federal court jurisdiction to
approve a consent decree against state
officials, the remedies in the decree
must only serve to: 1) resolve a dispute
within the court's subject matter
jurisdiction, 2) come within the
general scope of the case made by the
pleadings, and 3) further the objectives
of the law upon which the complaint
was based.
Although the district court engaged at
some length in a generalized discussion
of the Blessing factors, it is clear to us
that the district court did not conduct a
particularized Blessing analysis as to
each alleged violation of the consent
decree. *** Instead of determining
whether each alleged violation of the
consent decree was a statutory violation
actionable under Blessing, the court held
that "an interpretation of the decree must
be based strictly on the language of the
decree, and not on the legal requirements
of the Medicaid Act, except to the extent
that those requirements are clearly
imported by the language of the decree."
Firefighters is a consent decree case but
is not an Eleventh Amendment case, and
does not therefore address the deference
federal courts must show for the
Eleventh Amendment when called upon
to enjoin state officials under Ex Parte
Young. "Eleventh Amendment immunity
represents a real limitation on a federal
court's federal-question jurisdiction."
Moreover, we expressly distinguished
Firefighters in both Lelsz and Saahir,
reasoning that (1) Firefighters does not
help the plaintiff if the district court
lacks jurisdiction as a result of the
Eleventh Amendment, and (2) even if a
federal court is not necessarily barred
from entering a consent decree providing
broader relief than it could have awarded
at trial, it must fall back on its own
jurisdiction when it issues an order
enforcing the decree. The Eleventh
Amendment limits that jurisdiction to
the enforcement of federal rights.
Plaintiffs argue that Lelsz should be
limited to a consent decree based only
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on state law. The district court, likewise,
would limit Lelsz to suits to enforce only
state law claims, and "declined" to apply
it. We do not read Lelsz so narrowly, and
in any event Saahir cannot be read as
limited to state-law-based consent
decrees. Insofar as the district court
noted authority that found the distinction
we drew in Lelsz and Saahir between
jurisdiction to enter and jurisdiction to
enforce a consent decree "utterly
indefensible" or "untenable," the district
court, and we, are bound by the law of
our circuit.
Before the district court can remedy a
violation of a provision of the consent
decree, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
any such consent decree violation is also
a violation of a federal right, by showing
(1) a statutory violation of a specific
provision of the Medicaid Act, (2) which
was intended to benefit plaintiffs, (3)
which is not so vague and amorphous
that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence, and (4) which imposes a
binding obligation on the states. Lest the
court run afoul of Blessing, it must not
paint "with too broad a brush" by failing
to 'separate out the particular rights it
believe[s] arise from the statutory
scheme." The Blessing criteria can only
be properly applied when the claims are
"broken down into manageable analytic
bites."
3. Relief Available to Plaintiffs
a. Whether a Federal Court Can Set
EPSDT Performance and Participation
Standards
As discussed above, plaintiffs are only
entitled to injunctive relief if they can
show a violation of specific statutory
provision that is actionable under § 1983
because it satisfies the Blessing test.
Although relief under § 1983 for a
violation of EPSDT provisions may be
available, perfect state compliance with
these provisions is not required. While a
district court should have some
discretion to craft an injunction to
remedy violation of the Medicaid Act,
there are limits on the relief available
from a federal court.
We reach this conclusion based on our
understanding of congressional intent.
Our goal, of course, in construing a
statute is to give effect to congressional
intent, and we begin this task by looking
to the language of the statute itself.
In the pending case, the district court did
not direct that particular individuals
receive EPSDT services to which they
were entitled under federal law. It has
instead taken upon itself the task of
reworking the procedures and
mechanisms whereby EPSDT services
are provided to the totality of eligible
participants. The court has become
overseer of the State's Medicaid plan. As
such, the court assumes the role of
assuring that the State's plan meets
federal mandates, which in turn raises
the issue of whether the plan must
always, unfailingly, provide the EPSDT
services described in the Medicaid Act.
We think that is not required.
Congress did not intend that a court can
require that a state participating in the
Medicaid program must always provide
every EPSDT service to every eligible
person at all times. Perfect compliance
with such a complex set of requirements
is practically impossible, and we will not
infer congressional intent that a state
achieve the impossible. Furthermore,
looking to § 1396a(a)(43), even though
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it refers in subpart (A) to providing
notice to "all persons," and refers in
subpart (B) to the provision of EPSDT
screening services in "all cases" where
such services are requested, the opening
text of § 1396a(a) and § 1396a(a)(43)
modify all of this language by only
requiring that a state "plan" must
"provide for" meeting these
requirements. In § 1396a(b), Congress
vested in the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (Secretary) the initial
responsibility for approving state plans.
Section 1396a(a)(43)(D) requires that
the state plan provide for reporting
certain data including "the State's results
in attaining the participation goals set for
the State under section 1396d(r) of this
title." ***
In § 1396c, the Secretary is authorized to
reduce or eliminate, in its discretion,
federal funding for state plans which are
not in compliance with § 1396a.
In our view, Congress has therefore
spoken to the success expected of a state
plan: it should meet EPSDT
participation goals set by the Secretary.
Under the third prong of Blessing, these
are the only participation goals which
are unambiguously imposed on the
states. We do not read the statute as
allowing a federal district court to
require a higher standard of success.
Congress did not in our view create such
a federal right. Furthermore, under the
second prong of Blessing, allowing
federal courts, which are hardly expert at
the intricacies of providing volume
health care services to the poor, to
choose their own performance goals
would in our view render the EPSDT
provisions so vague and amorphous as to
strain judicial competence.
Moreover, we believe that plaintiffs
cannot sue under § 1983 to require a
plan to meet statewide or systemwide
participation or performance measures,
because, under Blessing, state
compliance with such standards is not an
individualized right actionable under §
1983. In Blessing, the court explained:
[T]he requirement that a State operate
its child support program in
"substantial compliance" with Title
IV-D was not intended to benefit
individual children and custodial
parents, and therefore it does not
constitute a federal right. Far from
creating an individual entitlement to
services, the standard is simply a
yardstick for the Secretary to measure
the systemwide performance of a
State's Title IV-D program. Thus, the
Secretary must look to the aggregate
services provided by the State, not to
whether the needs of any particular
person have been satisfied. A State
substantially complies with Title IV-D
when it provides most mandated
services (such as enforcement of
support obligations) in only 75 percent
of the cases reviewed during the
federal audit period. 45 C.F.R. §
305.20(a)(3)(iii) (1995). ***
An analogous situation is presented here.
The statute authorizes the Secretary to
set certain participation goals, and to cut
federal funding if "there is a failure to
substantially comply" with statutory
provisions. Under Blessing, a state's
failure to meet such a participation goal
or other systemwide performance
standard does not give rise to individual
rights actionable under § 1983. The fact
that plaintiffs have pursued their suit as a
class action is of no consequence. A
class action is merely a procedural
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device; it does not create new
substantive rights and cannot extend the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court.
b. Whether the Plaintiffs Have Shown a
Statutory Violation
We now proceed to decide whether
consent decree violations found by the
district court amount to a statutory
violation of the EPSDT provisions
actionable under § 1983.
Rather than focusing on the statutory
requirements, the court focused on the
consent decree requirements and
proceeded to find numerous consent
decree violations. These consent decree
provisions impose standards and
requirements on the State which are not
required by the Medicaid statute.
Looking to statutory EPSDT provisions,
the requirement of subpart 43(B) that a
state plan provide screening services is
limited to the provision of services
"where they are requested." We agree
with the state defendants that a statutory
violation of this requirement cannot
occur except in cases where eligible
persons request screening services. The
district court recognized that the
evidence did not support a finding that
screening services were ever denied after
they were so requested, noting that
"[s]everal witnesses testified that
defendants are not aware of a single
class member who has requested
services and not subsequently received
those services."
Whether the state plan has met
performance goals set by the Secretary is
unclear from the record. Regardless of
the terms of the consent decree, the
district court cannot impose higher
performance standards than those set by
the Secretary, and cannot under § 1983
impose systemwide performance or
participation standards. The court did not
find specific EPSDT statutory violations
which might be actionable under § 1983,
nor does any amount of sifting through
the evidence allow us to make such
findings. Instead the court found
violations of provisions of the consent
decree which are not required by the
Medicaid Act.
[The court reviews the district court's
various findings of violations of the
consent decrees, and concludes that the
court "was not authorized or competent
to impose its own participation goals."
"[T]he only participation goals mandated
under the statute are those set by the
Secretary, and that, under Blessing, such
performance goals do not give rise to
individual rights actionable under §
1983."]
In short, so far as we can tell from this
record, plaintiffs have not established
any violations of the EPSDT provisions
of the Medicaid statute which are
actionable under § 1983 and the Ex
Parte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The orders of the district court in both
appeals are VACATED and the case is
REMANDED for whatever proceedings
that may be consistent with this opinion.
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WASHINGTON (AP) The Supreme
Court agreed Monday to examine the
court system's ability to enforce deals
that states often strike to end mass
lawsuits and whether states can later
claim they are immune to allegations
that they had not lived up to the bargain.
The case about Medicaid benefits for the
poor could further the Supreme Court's
recent line of states' rights rulings that
have increased state powers at the
expense of individuals and Congress.
At issue is a 1996 court-approved
settlement that ended lawsuits over
health care for poor children in Texas.
The state did not admit liability but
agreed to make a variety of
improvements.
A group of poor children returned to
federal court in 1998, complaining the
state had violated the agreement. Among
cases they cited were a 2-year-old
cerebral palsy patient who could not
hold up his head up because he had not
received proper physical therapy and a
7-year-old who was not given a hearing
test that would have diagnosed his
deafness.
The Texas attorney general claimed that
the state was immune from the
challenges under the Constitution, and
the agreement was not fully enforceable
in court. The Constitution's 11th
Amendment makes state governments
immune to most individual federal
lawsuits, but there are exceptions.
Lawyers for children covered under
Medicaid argued the state had agreed to
the settlement, even urged a federal
judge to approve it, and thus should not
be allowed to shirk its duty.
A federal appeals court ruled for the
state last year. Texas did not waive its
constitutional immunity, and the federal
court did not have far-reaching
jurisdiction to enforce portions of the
1996 agreement, the appeals court said.
The lawsuit centers on the federal Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and
Treatment program, which covers about
1.5 million Texas children. The program
is supposed to provide poor children
with comprehensive and periodic
checkups, including evaluations of
children's development, nutritional and
dental status, vision and hearing.
The case is Frew v. Gilbert, 02-628.
Copyright @ 2003 The Associated Press.
All Rights Reserved.
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EPSDT program which provides
services described in the Medicaid Act.
A consent decree entered by the district
court is not enforceable against the state
or its officials except to vindicate a
federal right granted in the U.S.
Constitution or a federal statute, since
the consent decree does not enlarge the
courts' jurisdiction.
Frazar v. Gilbert, No. 00-41112,
7/24/2002.
FACTS: State officials take interlocutory
appeals from orders of the district court
that refused to modify a prior consent
decree and required detailed state action
in the administration of the Medicaid
program to afford health care to the
certified class of indigent children.
This suit began in 1993 when Jeneva
Frazar and Linda Frew, suing on behalf
of their children, alleged that the state of
Texas and the named state officials were
failing to provide federally mandated
Medicaid benefits to the children under
the Texas version of the early and
periodic screening, diagnostic and
treatment services (EPSDT) program.
The Medicaid program provides federal
funding for medical services to the poor.
State participation is voluntary, but once
a state joins the Medicaid program, it is
charged with administering a state plan
and must meet certain federal mandates.
A participating state must have an
The plaintiffs complained that the Texas
EPSDT program, known as the Texas
Health Steps program, had failed to
provide federally mandated services.
They claimed that the EPSDT program
did not meet various requirements of 42
U.S.C. §§1396a(a) and 1396d(r), federal
regulations, and provisions of the State
Medicaid Manual. The plaintiffs claimed
that the EPSDT program 1, did not have
policies or procedures to assure that
class members receive health, dental,
vision and hearing screens; 2. did not
meet annual participation goals set by
the Secretary of Health and Human
Services; 3. did not effectively inform
eligible persons of the availability of
EPSDT services; 4. did not employ
policies and procedures to provide or
arrange for other necessary measures to
correct or ameliorate physical and
mental conditions discovered by the
screening services; 5. did not provide
case management services to all EPSDT
recipients as needed; and 6. did not
provide services uniformly in all
political subdivisions of the state.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and requested
class certification. In 1994 the district
court certified the case as a class action.
According to the district court the class
consists of over 1.5 million Texas youth.
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The parties proceeded to conduct
settlement negotiations and agreed to a
consent decree. The record indicates that
this proposed consent decree was
reached after the district court ordered
the parties to pursue a settlement. The
district court conducted a fairness
hearing on the proposed settlement, and
in February 1996 approved and entered
the consent decree.
The consent decree in the pending case
is a lengthy document and orders the
state defendants to implement many
highly detailed and specific procedures
relating to the EPSDT program. It
contemplates continuing oversight of the
agreement by the district court. It states
in paragraph 6 that "the parties agree and
the court orders" the state defendants to
implement the changes and procedures
to the EPSDT program set out in the
decree, and provides in paragraph 303
that if the state defendants fail to comply
with the terms and intent of the decree,
the plaintiffs "may request relief from
this court." In paragraphs 306 and 307,
the state defendants are required, "[flor
the duration of this decree," to submit
''monitoring reports" four times a year to
the court. The reports must include a
chart which identifies "each paragraph of
this decree that obliges defendants to act
and each required action. The chart will
further state the status of each activity."
The decree places no limit on its
duration.
HOLDING: Vacated and remanded.
The district court held that the consent
decree was enforceable under §1983,
and in so doing rejected arguments that
its enforcement would violate the 11th
Amendment. This court holds that the
ruling below was an order "refusing to
dissolve or modify" an injunction under
28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1). Further, insofar
as the state defendants argued that
enforcement of the consent decree ran
afoul of the 11th Amendment, the
collateral order doctrine allows
immediate appellate review of an order
denying a claim of 11th Amendment
immunity.
Whether a statutory violation amounts to
a violation of a statutory right actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on three
factors recognized in Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997): "First,
Congress must have intended that the
provision in question benefit the
plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the right assertedly
protected by the statute is not so vague
and amorphous that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence. Third,
the statute must unambiguously impose
a binding obligation on the states. In
other words, the provision giving rise to
the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms."
A violation of every provision of the
Medicaid Act does not become
actionable under §1983 simply because
some aspects of the act meet the
requirements of Blessing and related
authority. Blessing itself cautioned
against such a holding, since it found
that the Social Security legislation at
issue was a "multifaceted statutory
scheme" containing many provisions
which "do not fit our traditional three
criteria for identifying statutory rights."
In Blessing, the court reasoned that a
remand was warranted to allow the
district court to construe the claims "in
the first instance, in order to determine
exactly what rights, considered in their
most concrete, specific form,
respondents are asserting. Only by
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manageably breaking down the
complaint into specific allegations can
the District Court proceed to determine
whether any specific claim asserts an
individual federal right."
The district court's authority to enforce
the consent decree is limited by the 11th
Amendment. This suit was brought
against state officials in their official
capacities, seeking injunctive relief
under §1983 and the authority of Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and
related authority.
The court recognized in Lelsz v.
Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.
1987) and Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758
(5th Cir. 1995), that a federal court
"must fall back on its inherent
jurisdiction" when it issues an order
enforcing a consent decree. The essential
holding of Lelsz and Saahir is that a
consent decree like the one entered by
the district court is not enforceable
against the state or its officials except to
vindicate a federal right granted in the
federal Constitution or a federal statute,
since the consent decree does not enlarge
the courts' jurisdiction. Blessing sets out
the factors used in deciding whether a
statutory violation amounts to a violation
of a "federal right" actionable under
§ 1983.
Before the district court can remedy a
violation of a provision of the consent
decree, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
any such consent decree violation is also
a violation of a federal right, by showing
1. a statutory violation of a specific
provision of the Medicaid Act; 2. which
was intended to benefit plaintiffs; 3.
which is not so vague and amorphous
that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence; and 4. which imposes a
binding obligation on the states. Lest the
court run afoul of Blessing, it must not
paint "with too broad a brush" by failing
to "separate out the particular rights it
believe[s] arise from the statutory
scheme." The Blessing criteria can only
be properly applied when the claims are
"broken down into manageable analytic
bites."
The statute authorizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to set
certain participation goals, and to cut
federal funding if "there is a failure to
substantially comply" with statutory
provisions. Under Blessing, a state's
failure to meet such a participation goal
or other systemwide performance
standard does not give rise to individual
rights actionable under § 1983. The fact
that plaintiffs have pursued their suit as a
class action is of no consequence. A
class action is merely a procedural
device; it does not create new
substantive rights and cannot extend the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court.
The plaintiffs have not established any
violations of the EPSDT provisions of
the Medicaid statute which are
actionable under § 1983 and the Ex Parte
Young exception to the 11th
Amendment.
A state can waive its 11th Amendment
immunity by voluntarily invoking the
federal court's jurisdiction, but in the
pending case the state did not do so; the
state officials were sued as defendants.
The state has not waived its 11th
Amendment immunity.
Plaintiffs are objecting to the shortage of
transportation for class members to
obtain dental services and to the rates of
337
payment set by the Texas Legislature.
Unless plaintiffs can prove that the right
to dental services is being denied by the
defendants, the court cannot act.
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